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This dissertation examines the functioning of ensemble representations at different levels 
of human visual processing: perception, attention, and memory. An ensemble 
representation refers to a global presentation that provides a general description of a set 
of items, computed from multiple individual measurements by collapsing across them. In 
the work presented in this dissertation, I demonstrate that 1) ensembles are extracted 
without representing each of individual measurements, similar to visual textures or 
perceptual grouping, 2) each ensemble representation can function as a unit for selection 
just as a more familiar construct for selection, i.e., an object, and that 3) each ensemble is 





Committee Members: Dr. Justin Halberda [Advisor]  
   Dr. Howard Egeth  
   Dr. Jonathan Flombaum 
   Dr. Barbara Landau 
   Dr. Soojin Park 
Alternate Committee: Dr. Lisa Feigenson  




This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many 
people. Many thanks to my advisor, Justin Halberda, who have provided exceptional 
support both intellectually and emotionally for five years in Hopkins. He has been 
instrumental in the development of my thinking and his comments and suggestions have 
never failed to be insightful and inspiring. Also thanks to my committee members for 
offering guidance and support. I am very grateful to have talented colleagues around me 
who are always friendly and fun to be with in the lab and department. Last but certainly 
not least, thanks to my loving family (both in the US and in Korea) and numerous friends 
(also both in the US and in Korea) who endured this long process with me, always 
offering great support and love.  
  
 iv 


































































List of Figures 
 Figure 2. 1 An example of texture from a natural image. ................................................ 12!
Figure 2. 2 A sample trial of Ensemble block. ................................................................. 22!
Figure 2. 3 Cartoon examples of arrays from Ensemble block, with different levels of 
external noise- (a) 1˚, (b) 3˚, (c) 6˚, and (d) 10˚ ........................................................ 23!
Figure 2. 4 Results: Discrimination thresholds for the ensemble conditions at each 
bandwidth .................................................................................................................. 27!
Figure 2. 5 Results and model ........................................................................................... 28!
Figure 2. 6 Fitted parameters from the variance summation model and the internal noise 
for individual object blocks ...................................................................................... 29!
 
 Figure 3.1 Different possibilities of grouping .................................................................. 38!
Figure 3. 2 A sample trial of Experiment B ...................................................................... 39!
Figure 3. 3 Basic algorithm of K-clustering ..................................................................... 41!
Figure 3. 4 Results: example of responses on the four selected stimulus images ............ 44!
Figure 3. 5 Examples of correlation between responses from different subjects ............. 45!
Figure 3. 6 Histogram of the best-fit clustering thresholds .............................................. 46!
Figure 3. 7 Average of the best-fit grouping window size at different stimulus durations
................................................................................................................................... 47!
Figure 3. 8 Model prediction of each human subject using the best-fit grouping window 
size ............................................................................................................................ 47!
Figure 3. 9 Average slope for four categories of clusteredness ........................................ 51!
 
 viii 
Figure 4. 1 Sample displays for Ensemble subitizing and Object subitizing tasks ........... 59!
!      Figure 4. 2 A sample trial of Ensemble subitizing task ........................................... 60!
Figure 4. 3 Avarege RT as a function of the numerosity .................................................. 61!
Figure 4. 4 A sample of Experiment E ............................................................................. 63!
Figure 4. 5 (a) Proportion error for Ensemble subitizing task (b) CV for Approximate 
number task ............................................................................................................... 64!
 
Figure 5. 1 A sample trial of Experiment F. The column A indicates 0-msec trials and the 
column B indicates the regular trials with longer durations ..................................... 71!
Figure 5. 2 One subject's responses collected only from the 0-msec trials ...................... 77!
Figure 5. 3 Guessing pattern across set size (example from one subject) ........................ 77!
Figure 5. 4 Model for internal representation of approximate number ............................. 80!
Figure 5. 5 Simulation results ........................................................................................... 81!
Figure 5. 6 Model results: each dot indicates likelihood of being drown from internal 
representation (RED) as opposed to from guesing (GREEN) .................................. 83!
Figure 5. 7 Model results: histogram of the likelihood values from Figure 5.6 ............... 83!
Figure 5. 8 Summary results, averaged across subjects .................................................... 84!
Figure 5. 9 Fitted parameters for the growth curve (examples of two subjects) .............. 85!
 1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 In this dissertation, I investigate the functioning of “ensemble features” in human 
visual processing. The terms ensemble and ensemble features are relatively new terms in 
the vision sciences literature. They are meant to indicate a type of summary 
representation – like noticing the average size among a group of circles rather than 
focusing on each of the individual sizes. Because these terms are relatively new, and 
because there is not yet a vast literature in which previous authors have explored all of 
the relevant distinctions, I will endeavor through this dissertation to explore the 
functioning of ensemble representations at many levels throughout visual processing.  
 The dissertation is structured as a series of chapters that each explores ensemble 
representations at a particular level of visual processing. For example, In Chapter 2 I will 
explore ensemble representations in perception and explore a parallel between ensemble 
processing and texture processing. And, in Chapter 5, I will explore the encoding and 
storage of ensemble information in visual working memory. A review of the literature 
relevant to each chapter appears at the beginning of each chapter. Here, I begin with an 
overview of my dissertation – in Section 1.1 I will briefly introduce the topic of ensemble 
representations and review the existing literature on ensemble representations that is 
relevant to all of my chapters; and, in Section 1.2, I will present an overview the 
experiments included in my dissertation. I have also included a Synopsis at the beginning 
of each chapter. I will use these sections to briefly remind the reader of the goals of the 
dissertation, placing each chapter in context, and will highlight the main results for that 
chapter. The main thread of the dissertation can be experienced by reading just the 
synopses.  
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1.1 INTRODUCING ENSEMBLE REPRESENTATIONS 
An ensemble representation is a global representation that provides a statistical 
description of a set of items, computed from multiple individual measurements by 
collapsing across them. For example, people are remarkably efficient and accurate at 
computing averages, including the mean size (Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003; 
Im & Chong, 2009), and average orientation (Dakin & Watt, 1997; Parkes, Lund, 
Angelucci, Solomon, & Morgan, 2001). 
An ensemble representation can be any representation that is computed from 
multiple individual measurements (for review, see Alvarez, 2011). Individual 
measurements can be collapsed or combined across space or time, based on a particular 
feature dimension or two (Eisinger, Im, Pailian, & Halberda, 2013; Emmanouil & 
Treisman, 2008) and provide a single description of a set of individuals. The value of 
these kinds of representations has been argued to be that, while rapid and approximate, 
ensemble representations are rich enough to support an understanding of the visual 
environment, because the environment often consists of collections of similar objects 
(e.g., faces in crowd, cars in a parking lot). And, even at a more primitive level, natural 
images often contain remarkable regularities in terms of physical intensities such as 
luminance or contrast (Brady & Field, 2000). Due to these redundancies and regularities, 
the visual environment is highly structured and predictable (Kersten, 1987). Thus, 
forming ensemble representations by capitalizing on this structure and redundancy is 
rational and efficient. Converging evidence shows that observers are in fact remarkably 
efficient and accurate at representing ensemble features, including the mean size (Ariely, 
2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003), average brightness (Bauer, 2009), average orientation 
 3 
(Dakin & Watt, 1997; Parkes et al., 2001; Rubenstein & Sagi, 1990), average location of 
a collection of objects (i.e., centroid; Alvarez & Oliva, 2008), average direction of motion 
(Williams & Sekuler, 1984), approximate number (Feigenson, 2008; Halberda, Sires, & 
Feigenson, 2006), average emotion (Haberman & Whitney, 2007a) and identity (de 
Fockert & Wolfenstein, 2009) of faces. In these various feature dimensions, multiple 
local measurements can be combined to give rise to a higher-level description of a 
collection of similar items.   
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1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
In this dissertation I explore ensemble processing through the lenses of 
perception, attention, and memory. As an overview, my dissertation will demonstrate that 
1) ensembles are extracted without representing each individual measurement, similar to 
visual textures or perceptual grouping, 2) each ensemble representation can function as a 
unit for selection, similar to the more familiar construct for selection, i.e., an object, and 
3) each ensemble is encoded and stored in visual working memory in an all-or-none 
manner, similar to a slot-like object-based working memory. Here, I provide a description 
of each chapter.  
1.2.1 Overview of Chapter 2  
One of the most active controversies throughout the literature on ensemble 
representations has focused on the question of whether representing ensemble features 
requires a mechanism distinct from that of representing individual objects. For example, 
Myczek and Simons (2008) argued that ensemble representations require no mechanism 
distinct from simply exploiting focused attention and sampling a few individual items 
from a visual array. However, an alternative possibility is that humans represent 
ensemble features relying on a distinct mechanism that is more similar to texture 
perception in which early feature information is pooled across regions without requiring 
segmentation or sampling of individual objects (Dakin & Watt, 1997; Im & Halberda, 
2012; Malik & Perona, 1990; Parkes et al., 2001). Determining whether ensemble 
representations rely on mechanisms similar to or distinct from those employed when 
selecting individual items requires that we measure hallmarks or signatures of visual 
processing that may distinguish these modes of processing. Two such factors are the 
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internal noise that affects ensemble representation and the sample size that is used when 
people build these representations. In Chapter 2, I empirically measure the discrimination 
thresholds for representing the individual size of a single object and representing the 
average size of multiple objects. By using a variance summation modeling approach, I 
estimate both the internal noise and the number of samples that support the representation 
of ensemble average size. Group fits from the variance summation model determined the 
estimate of 7.0 samples from each display, which exceeds the widely discussed (but not 
uncontroversial) estimate of a three- to four-item object-based limit of selective attention 
(Oksama & Hyönä, 2004; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). Additionally, the estimate of 
internal noise for ensemble size was lower than the internal noise for a single object. 
Taken together, the results in Chapter 2 suggest that the ensemble representation average 
size relies on a mechanism that is distinct from segmenting individual items. The work in 
Chapter 2 has been published in Attention, Perception and Psychophysics (Im & 
Halberda, 2012).  
1.2.2 Overview of Chapter 3  
  Chapter 3 investigates perceptual grouping as one candidate for a mechanism 
supporting rapid extraction of ensembles from brief visual scenes. I argue that the 
ensemble feature approximate number can be extracted following perceptual grouping in 
which elements are clustered into sub-groups in a fast, pre-attentive manner. Experiment 
B first implements a new approach to modeling how humans define sub-groups of items 
within a single larger cluster. I have found that human estimates of groups of items are 
well described by a k-means clustering algorithm that is widely used for image 
segmentation in computer vision. I present a model that estimates the number of clusters 
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within images of dot collections with a single free parameter for center-to-center distance 
among items (i.e., clustering threshold). The model results show that the best-fit 
clustering threshold – resulting in cluster estimates that converge with human observers’ 
own verbal estimates – was a distance of 4˚. This estimate was stable from as early as 50 
msec of display time, and highly consistent across individuals. Thus, grouping items into 
clusters relies on a fast pre-attentive process that is well fit by k-means clustering. 
Experiment C further investigates how such grouping may influence numerical 
estimation of the total number of items in dot arrays. I have found that subjects tend to 
underestimate the number of dots when the image contains many clusters (as fit by the 
clustering algorithm). Using the best-fit clustering thresholds of individual subjects, the 
model reliably predicts the subject’s estimates of the number of individual items across a 
wide range of images. This provides a computational treatment for what has previously 
been a simple “rule of thumb” in the literature – that humans tend to underestimate. 
Together, the results reported in Chapter 3 suggest that the ensemble representation 
approximate number may rely on a mechanism supporting fast, pre-attentive perception 
of visual clusters affected by bottom-up perceptual grouping within a visual scene.  
1.2.3 Overview of Chapter 4  
 In Chapter 4, I argue that each ensemble collection functions as a single unit for 
visual indexing and visual selective attention, akin to being an individual object. I focus 
on a well-known process that requires attention to individuate items: subtizing. In 
Experiment D, I recorded response times (RT) when subjects were asked to report the 
number of ensembles and the number of objects in various arrays. I have found that 
subitizing ensembles results in an almost identical RT function to that of subitizing 
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individual objects. That is, just as humans tend to be fast and accurate for determining 
that there are 1, 2, or 3 objects in an array, they are fast and accurate at determining that 
there are 1, 2, or 3 ensemble clusters in an array. In Experiment E, I further found that the 
accuracy of subitizing ensembles highly correlated with the accuracy of extracting 
approximate number from the ensembles. These results together suggest that, under some 
conditions, ensembles receive a single visual index and function the same way an object 
does for visual attention – suggesting that ensemble representations, built from multiple 
samples, serve as individual units for attentional selection.  
1.2.4 Overview of Chapter 5 
 In Chapter 5, I ask whether the precision of ensemble representations improve 
with increased processing time (e.g., display time) and decreased item load (e.g., number 
of groups). I present an experiment in which subjects were presented with a flash 
containing 1, 3, or 6 sets of multiple dots for varying durations and were asked to 
estimate the number of dots in one of the sets from memory, where the probed set was 
highlighted after the stimulus flash and a mask disappeared. Because behavioral 
responses reflect a mixture of responses based on internal representations and those based 
on strategic guesses, it has become crucial to sort a subject’s responses into these two 
classes (i.e., responses based on an internal representation of the stimulus, and those 
based on strategic guessing) in order to determine if internal representations are indeed 
‘flexible’ (i.e., with variable precision across time and load) or ‘fixed’ (i.e., at a specific 
level of precision). For doing so, I present a novel mixture modeling method that includes 
both the empirically measured guessing pattern from each individual subject and an 
empirically-appropriate model for human internal representation of approximate number. 
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This approach is able to accurately sort human observers’ responses into those based on 
an internal representation of the target and those drawn from their non-random, strategic 
guessing pattern. Previously, this approach has not been used in the literature and other 
authors have merely assumed that human guessing is uniform and random. I demonstrate 
that this assumption is inappropriate. 
 The empirical guessing pattern was measured for each individual subject by 
including trials of 0-msec-duration in which no stimulus was actually presented. These 0-
msec-duration trials were not noticed by subjects because they were randomly intermixed 
with other various durations (33 - 198 msec) and every trial was presented with an 
effective mask. I found that subjects guessing patterns on the 0-msec-duration trials were 
surprisingly consistent across individuals, and clearly not random nor uniform. It seems 
that subjects had a strong tendency to choose values in the middle of the response scale 
(which ranged from 1 to 50) and avoided the values in the extremes, with the overall 
guessing pattern being unimodal.  
 Internal representation, the other component of the mixture model, was 
characterized by a power function between the target feature value and a subject’s 
behavioral response. The key factors that determine the shape of the internal 
representation in this mixture model are an exponent of the mapping function (β) and the 
shape of standard deviation (SD) that linearly increases with the target feature value.  
 The empirically measured guessing pattern and the appropriate functional 
description for internal representation enables the mixture model to more accurately 
remove guessing trials from behavioral responses and to provide a more reliable estimate 
of the precision of internal representations. I found that the mixture model estimates of 
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the precision (inverse of SD) of number representations at different processing times (33 
- 198 msec) and with different item load (1,3, and 6 sets) remained constant, suggesting 
that the precision of number representation is not flexible but fixed. What changed over 
processing time and with varying item load instead was the proportion of guessing trials. 
That is, when processing time is insufficient or when item load is high, subjects do not 
rely on their internal representations but choose to strategically guess. Together, the 
results in Chapter 5 suggest that the representation of the ensemble feature approximate 
number has a fixed precision and that encoding of approximate number into visual 
working memory is a discrete and all-or-none process.  
1.2.5 Summary Statement and Caveat  
 This dissertation represents an attempt to understand ensemble processes in vision 
from early perceptual processes (e.g., Chapter 2, textures and sampling; Chapter 3, 
perceptual grouping), through working memory (e.g., Chapter 5, encoding precision and 
memory capacity). As I’ve already highlighted, the term “ensemble representation” is a 
relatively new construct in the literature. As such, the work in this dissertation must be 
treated as somewhat of a “case study”, in that I focus here primarily on approximate 
number with some discussion of average size as well.  Because the construct of 
“ensemble representation” might itself turn out to be an umbrella term encompassing a 
diversity of processes and representations that may not all function alike (e.g., average 
orientation and speed pooling mechanisms might be implemented in earlier visual areas 
than approximate number), the work in this dissertation stands as a thorough 
investigation of approximate number and must be taken with some caution as a case 
study for how other ensemble representations may function in perception and cognition. 
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CHAPTER 2. ENSEMBLES IN PERCEPTION, 1: THE ENSEMBLE FEATURE 
AVERAGE SIZE IS EXTRACTED WITHOUT REPRESENTING INDIVIDUAL 
SIZES, SIMILAR TO VISUAL TEXTURES 
 
2.1 SYNOPSIS 
 In Chapter 2, I will argue that ensemble visual processing does not require 
segmentation of individual objects but rather relies on a global pooling process. The 
results of Experiment A support this claim by showing that 1) the estimated internal noise 
affecting ensemble representations is lower than the internal noise of representing 
individual objects and 2) the estimated number of samples required for ensemble 
representations is much more than the number of individual objects that can be selected at 
once.  
I begin in Section 2.2 with a review of the relevant literature on texture 
perception, because the insights from the study of texture processing is informative in 
understanding how global pooling mechanism can provide ensemble representations 
without segmenting individual elements. I also review the framework of two different 
modes of attention (focused vs. distributed) in order to draw a direct analogy to two 
distinct mechanisms: one for ensemble representation (possibly relying on distributed 
attention), and one for the representation of individual objects (possibly relying on 




2.2.1 Texture perception 
 The nature of texture processing has been extensively explored and reveals the 
extremely high precision and efficiency of the visual system when extracting texture 
information from a visual scene within a brief exposure (Bergen & Julesz, 1983; Portilla 
& Simoncelli, 2000). The existing literature on texture perception already shows that 
statistical properties of a texture region are effortlessly processed by the visual system 
(Baker & Mareschal, 2001; Dakin, 2001; Morgan & Glennerster, 1991; Parkes et al., 
2001; Victor, Chubb, & Conte, 2005) and affect segmentation of subparts of the visual 
scene (Bergen & Adelson, 1988; Grossberg & Mingolla, 1985; Malik & Perona, 1990; 
Wolfson & Landy, 1998). Thus, texture appears to be processed before the segmentation 
of individual objects.  
 Global orientation of variable textons has been one of the most prevalent 
examples of extraction of a global texture attribute (Blake & Marinos, 1990). Global 
orientation of a textural area seems to result from the integration of local orientation 
measures. For example, Sagi (1990) found that performance on visual search for a 
vertical target was affected by the number of horizontal distractors in the search array, 
suggesting a compulsory integration of horizontal distractors with a vertical target over 
the entire search array. Such data has supported the notion of “hyper-filters”, in which 
local orientation measures over an entire area are integrated, without segmentation (Sagi, 
1990). In addition, segregation of areas by their textures has been shown to be sensitive 
to the rate of change of texel orientation across space but not to the local density of texels 
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Conversely, internal noise can be understood to derive from the limitations, or 
inherent noise, of the system when representing a single oriented contour.  Additional 
internal noise could derive from any biases or information loss in the averaging process 
that combines the local orientation samples. That is, the variance of local orientations is a 
source of external noise that can limit the perception of the average orientation of a 
texture in combination with the constant internal noise of the system. Data suggest that 
integration of texton orientation occurs prior to the judgment of average orientation of a 
texture field and the arithmetic mean of texton orientations predicts thresholds well 
(Watt, 1991). In addition to the arithmetic mean, observers can extract the variability of 
orientations in a texture field (Dakin & Watt, 1997). The integration of orientation seems 
to require a low attentional load; it can be extracted within a brief exposure of 100 msec 
to the stimulus.  Computational models of texture perception suggest that only a subset of 
textons is sampled and pooled over the visual array. For example, the variance 
summation model (Dakin, 2001) fitted to the psychophysical data from human subjects 
revealed that providing the model with a subset of the textons in the visual array, 
determined by a power function, could yield the level of discrimination thresholds 
comparable to those from human subjects’ data. The number of samples required by the 
model increased from 4 to 90 textons while the actual number of textons presented to the 
humans increased from 4 to 1024, suggesting fairly coarse processing by the human 
subjects. Indeed, fine-grained representation of individual elements of texture seems to be 
unnecessary in texture perception as any high-resolution representation of individual 
textons becomes inaccessible due to the presence of other neighboring textons, just as in 
the crowding effect in peripheral vision. For example, Parkes et al. (2001) showed that 
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even when information about the individual orientations of items in the periphery is lost 
due to crowding by adjacent distractors, the orientation of these items can affect the 
representation of the average orientation of the array, suggesting that texture processing 
might occur even without a rigid and stable representation at the level individual objects.  
It seems that there may be a strong analogy between ensemble representation and 
texture perception. It has been suggested that ensemble representation and texture 
processing may rely on the similar processes (Cavanagh, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003; 
Haberman & Whitney, 2010; Parkes et al., 2001). For example, recent findings on 
ensemble representation suggested that just as in texture perception (e.g., Parkes et al., 
2001), individual representations of elements may be lost or at least be discounted while 
a more holistic, overall impression is maintained (Alvarez & Oliva, 2009; Haberman & 
Whitney, 2010). In addition, ensemble representations also appear to be basic visual 
attributes that are susceptible to perceptual adaptation (e.g., approximate number: Burr & 
Ross, 2008; mean size: Corbett, Wurnitsch, Schwartz, & Whitney, 2012). 
Despite the similarities, a strong connection between ensemble representations 
and texture perception remains to be made. At the moment, these two lines of research 
have been conducted separately and differently. For example, the literature on texture 
perception has focused on an observer’s ability to extract average feature information 
over region of the scene or even over a whole scene, whereas the newer literature on 
ensemble representations has focused on an observer’s ability to extract the statistical 
average from an array of well-defined, separately attendable objects. In a typical texture 
stimulus, it is difficult (and sometimes impossible) to recognize the individual elements 
that make up the texture (Dakin & Watt, 1997; Dakin, 1999; Morgan, Chubb, & 
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Solomon, 2008) because each element has unclear, blurred edges and many elements are 
spatially overlapping one another in a display. This is on purpose, because researchers 
interested in texture have wanted to avoid the possibility of object-based processing in 
order to focus on texture-based processing. In contrast, the visual stimuli that have been 
used in studies of ensemble representation typically contain many fewer items (e.g., 4-35 
objects) and each item can be easily recognized as a separable object (e.g., dots, faces, 
and so on) without any spatial overlaps. Thus, while there may be similarities between 
texture processing and ensemble processing, these connections have yet to be fully 
explored. 
 Another complication of the previous research that makes it difficult to draw a 
direct connection between textures and ensembles is that most of the feature dimensions 
that the literature on ensemble representation has investigated (e.g., size of circles: 
Ariely, 2001; or gender, emotion, or identity of faces: Haberman & Whitney, 2007b) do 
not lend themselves to being understood as basic visual features like orientation of a 
texton. For example, average size was one of the first ensemble features to be 
investigated (Ariely, 2001) but it has perhaps drawn the most skepticism and widest 
criticism - owing, perhaps, to the suggestions that early visual areas have no “size-tuned” 
neurons (Myczek & Simons, 2008) and that representing object size is traditionally 
thought to require selecting individual objects from the background (Bundesen & Larsen, 
1975; Cave & Kosslyn, 1989). Thus, in a direct denial of a connection to non-object-
based texture processing, criticisms of the literature on average size have primarily 
focused on the possibility that average size is computed from object-based sampling 
strategies, with focused attention involved. In Chapter 2, I directly address this issue and 
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present empirical data suggesting that representing average size does not rely on a 
mechanism that requires segmentation or sampling of individual objects.  
Recently it has been suggested that texture perception might also provide an 
appropriate description for much of everyday visual processing, such as representing the 
gist of natural scenes or arrays of segmentable objects, and may also operate at higher-
level stages of visual processing than previously believed (Freeman & Simoncelli, 2011). 
For example, visual crowding effects in arrays of individual objects (e.g., in peripheral 
vision) has been hypothesized to arise from compulsory pooling of peripheral 
information, just as in texture processing (Parkes et al., 2001; Denis G Pelli, Palomares, 
& Majaj, 2004). Further, Balas et al. (2009) showed that a texture model based on a 
statistical description of the visual array (Portilla & Simoncelli, 2000) provided an 
accurate fit to human performance for the visual crowding effect in peripheral vision in 
displays containing multiple objects. Together, the insights from the study of texture 
processing may still be particularly valuable and informative when critically evaluating 
the newer literature on ensemble representation. 
2.2.2 Focused attention vs. Distributed attention 
 The issue of whether ensemble representation requires segmenting and sampling 
of individual objects can be addressed under the framework of two different modes of 
attention: focused attention and distributed attention (for review, see Treisman, 2006). 
These two modes of attention provide different types of information about the visual 
scene. As we navigate through the visual environment, for example, we sometimes focus 
our attention on a single object, such as a tree, and sometimes we spread our attention 
over a larger area to see only the forest as a whole. We can then represent two different 
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types of information from the forest: information about the individual trees (e.g., height, 
color, or orientation of the individual trees) and information about the global properties of 
the forest on its own (e.g., area, darkness, or density of the whole forest). As in this 
example, most visual environments can be hierarchically structured. Thus, perceptual 
mechanisms have evolved to form representations that connect objects hierarchically, and 
in this way we come to represent properties of the wholes (e.g., forest) as well as 
properties of their component parts (e.g., trees). Different aspects of visual processing 
seem to be favored by each mode of attention. At one extreme, we bind the features of a 
single object and perhaps select and identify it using focused attention on the single 
object (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; A. Treisman & Gelade, 1980). At the other 
extreme, we may obtain rapid access to the gist, a global layout and semantic 
interpretation of the scene as a whole using globally distributed attention over the scene 
(e.g., Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Potter, 1976), possibly without having to 
focus on any of the single elements in the scene. 
 For focused attention, much research has demonstrated that there are severe limits 
for our capacity to process, segment, and store many individual items in parallel. For 
example, observers cannot attend or store more than only a few items (e.g., three- or four- 
item limits in attention and in visual working memory: Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Bays 
& Husain, 2008; Cowan, 2001; Dobkins & Bosworth, 2001; Franconeri, Alvarez, & 
Enns, 2007; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Palmer, Ames, & Lindsey, 1993; Palmer, 1990; Sakai, 
Morishita, & Matsumoto, 2007; Simons & Levin, 1997). Some authors have suggested 
that these limits are imposed because of some fixed amount of overall energy, or resource 
(e.g., neuronal real estate), available to the brain and by the energy cost of the neuronal 
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activity that is involved in computation (for review, see Carrasco, 2011). Given such 
limited amounts of overall energy, so the story goes, stimuli compete for limited 
resources for further processing (Broadbent, 1958; Neisser, 1967; Treisman, 1960), and 
this notion is supported by electrophysiological, neuroimaging, and behavioral findings 
(for review, see Beck & Kastner, 2009; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). When observers 
attend to a given location in a visual array, competition is biased in favor of the neurons 
encoding information at the attended area. As a result, neurons with receptive fields at 
that location become more active, while other activation is suppressed (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). In this way, focused attention allows us to overcome our brain’s limited 
capacity by selectively processing only some part of the available objects or information. 
Focused attention optimizes the use of the system’s limited resources by enhancing the 
representations of the relevant, while diminishing the representations of the less relevant.  
 In contrast to focused attention on individual items, Treisman (2006) suggested 
that ensemble representations may be extracted in the mode of distributed attention. 
Distributed attention is deployed globally over several objects at once or over the scene 
as a whole and may not be affected by such severe capacity limitations as focused 
attention (e.g., as indexed by number of relevant items). Distributed attention was 
investigated by the classic study pioneered by Navon (1977) in which global and local 
processing of shape information (e.g., letter shape) competed with each other. In his 
study, a large letter shape was made of multiples of a different letter shape, each with a 
smaller size. When observers saw this stimulus, they were better and faster at recognizing 
the global letter than local letter. Navon reported this finding as the evidence supporting 
global precedence. Global precedence, in a different sense, is also reflected in the 
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asymmetry of interference between global and local forms: A global form typically 
creates greater interference in the processing of a local form than vice versa (Hoffman, 
1980; Miller, 1981; Pomerantz, 1983).  
  
2.3 EXPERIMENT A: ESTIMATING OBSERVERS’ INTERNAL NOISE AND 
NUMBER OF SAMPLES FOR EXTRACTING AVERAGE SIZE 
 Here I present an empirical study designed to determine whether ensemble 
representation requires segmenting and sampling individual objects. I use a variance 
summation modeling approach in order to estimate internal noise and sample size for the 
ensemble process that pools evidence across multiple samples for average size. In this 
chapter I address two specific questions regarding the mechanisms supporting ensemble 
representation: is the internal noise for ensemble processing lower than the internal noise 
for processing individual items, and does the number of samples required by ensemble 
processing exceed the 3-4 item limit of object-based attention? If so, each of these points 
would suggest that ensemble representation does not require the segmentation of 
individual objects. 
 
2.3.1 Experimental method 
I relied on a standard two-alternative forced choice psychophysical discrimination 
task in which subjects had to judge which of two briefly flashed arrays had either the 
larger individual size or the larger average size. Each of the participants completed two 
separate sets of experimental blocks for measuring discrimination thresholds of 
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representing ensemble orientations of multiple gratings and representing individual 
orientation of a single grating. Having both sets of experimental blocks (Ensembles and 
Single gratings) allowed for direct comparisons between representations of ensembles 
and individual objects within subject.  
Subjects 
16 subjects participated in the experiment. Two among the 16 subjects were 
experienced subjects and the others were naive subjects. All of the subjects had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The naive subjects received course extra credit for 
participating.  
Apparatus and stimuli  
The stimuli were generated using MATLAB software, together with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; D G Pelli, 1997), and were displayed 
on an LCD monitor driven by a Macintosh iMac computer (the viewable area was a gray 
central square window with a 17-in. diagonal). The subjects were seated approximately 
50 cm from the screen and viewed the display binocularly. At this viewing distance, each 
pixel was approximately 0.04 of visual angle, and each grating subtended between 1.6 
and 4.0 of visual angle. The stimuli were presented on a gray background and consisted 
of one or more sinusoidal gratings with a spatial frequency of 4 cycles/deg and a 
Michelson contrast of 99.8%.  
In the Ensemble block, multiple gratings (9, 11, 13, 16, 19, or 23 gratings) were 
randomly located on the display, subtending 56 x 40 of visual angle. In the Single-grating 
block, only one grating appeared within this same viewing area. The locations of gratings 
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varied across the two stimulus arrays in order to minimize the masking of stimuli in the 
second flash by those in the first flash. 
To focus on the ensemble processing of distinct objects, we ensured that each 
item in the array was a segmentable individual object. Each object on the display had a 
clearly drawn border that was salient in order to avoid blur and reduce the blending of 
gratings and background. Because crowding by adjacent stimuli occurs in a compulsory 
manner and may be equivalent to perceiving texture (Parkes et al., 2001), we also ensured 
that adjacent gratings were separated from each other by at least half of their eccentricity 
in the display- that is, crowding in foveal vision only occurs over very small distances (2-
6 arcmin; Toet & Levi, 1992) whereas crowding in peripheral visual occurs over larger 
distances, roughly at about half of the eccentricity (Pelli & Tillman, 2008). This ensured 
that our displays were not crowded.  
Procedure 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the procedure. The procedure required subjects to view two 
brief displays (100 ms each), one after the other, and then to judge which display, the first 
of second, contained either the larger average size (Ensemble blocks) or the larger 
individual grating (Single-grating blocks). Auditory feedback for errors was provided 
throughout. The short exposure duration of 100 ms was chosen to prevent scanning eye 
movements (Morgan, Ward, & Castet, 1998). The interstimulus interval was randomly 
varied from 1000 to 2200 ms, making the onset of the second flash unpredictable, in 
order to disrupt strategic planning in preparation for the second display. This delay also 
reduced any afterimage effects of the first stimulus display, as well as possible effects of 




randomly among six values (30˚, 60˚, 90˚, 120˚, 150˚, and 180˚), which allowed the 
gratings to look more distinct. 
In the Single-grating block, I measured size discrimination thresholds for a single 
grating at the standard size of 2.8˚ in diameter. We included two different sub-blocks that 
varied the locations of the single gratings, one in a foveal region (4˚ x 4˚ around the 
fixation cross) and one in the periphery (from 56˚ x 40˚ of visual angle, but never 
appearing within the 4˚ x 4˚ foveal region). Including two blocks allowed us to estimate 
the reduction of size sensitivity as a function of eccentricity. 
Each of the six sub-blocks (four sub-blocks for the Ensemble block and two sub-
blocks for the Single-grating block) lasted approximately 15 min, and the order of these 
blocks was randomized across subjects. All blocks were run during a single session.  
 
2.3.2 Modeling: Variance summation model 
The variance summation approach enables one to measure how observers’ 
response variability may change as a function of stimulus variability. Intuitively, it should 
be easier for an observer to estimate the average size of an ensemble when variability in 
size is low, and performance should become poorer as variability increases (Figure 2.3) 
The variance summation approach exploits a noise analysis that assumes the additivity of 
variances on the basis of convolution to model the data (Equation 1) in terms of the local 
and global limits of the system and external noise. In the variance summation model, the 
local and global limits are characterized by the internal noise of the ensemble averaging 
mechanism and the sample size that the observer gathers from the stimulus, and the 
external noise is assessed by the variability embedded within the stimulus, such that  
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  σ!"# = ! σ!"#
! + σ!"#
!/n ,  [1] 
where σ!"#!is the observed threshold, σ!"#!is the intrinsic or internal noise, σ!"#!is the 
external noise, and n is the number of samples being employed. In the experiments of 
Chapter 2, σ!"#!is the variability of the sizes within an ensemble of sine gratings (e.g., 
Figure 2.3), which is under the experimenter’s control (i.e., the Gaussian distribution of 
object sizes in the display). σ!"#!is the noise or error inside the head of the observer (also 
assumed to be Gaussian) that affects their estimate of the ensemble average. Thus, 
Equation 1 is simply a way of combining these two Gaussian sources of noise in order to 
fit the observed sensitivity of the observer.  
By measuring observed thresholds (σ!"#) at multiple levels of external noise 
(σ!"#), it is possible to fit values for the internal noise affecting the ensemble averaging 
mechanism (σ!"#) and the number of samples (n) that the observer seems to rely on (i.e., 
the number of individual gratings a subject averages). When the external variability 
(σ!"#) is lower than the internal noise (σ!"#), the observed threshold (σ!"#) will derive 
almost entirely from the internal noise. But as the external variability (σ!"#) increases, it 
will eventually come to exceed the internal noise (σ!"#) to become the dominant force 
determining the observed threshold (σ!"#). Intuitively, the observed threshold will not 
increase rapidly until the external noise is greater than the internal noise.  
Sample size will function to raise or lower the observed thresholds (σ!"#) across 
all levels of external noise (σ!"#), as pooling evidence from greater numbers of items will 
result in reduced observed thresholds (σ!"#). The pattern of reduction in the observed 
thresholds due to increased sample size is distinct and separable from the reduction that 
occurs from reduced internal noise. The approach used in Chapter 2 was inspired by 
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previous research in which variance summation modeling has been used to estimate the 
internal noise and efficiency (i.e., sample size) of texture discrimination mechanisms 
(Beaudot & Mullen, 2005; S. C. Dakin, 2001; Steven C Dakin, Bex, Cass, & Watt, 2009; 
Demanins, Hess, Williams, & Keeble, 1999; Heeley, Buchanan-Smith, Cromwell, & 
Wright, 1997). A benefit of this approach is that, once generated, estimates of the internal 
noise affecting ensemble processing can be compared to behavioral estimates of the 
internal noise affecting individual object processing to address the question of whether or 
not the internal noise for ensemble processing is lower than that for processing individual 
items. 
 
2.3.3 Results and Discussion 
In the Ensemble blocks, we systematically manipulated the variability of the sizes 
within each ensemble as a source of external noise (Figure 2.3). If ensemble 
representations pool evidence across items that vary in size, the observed thresholds 
should increase systematically with increasing external noise. Figure 2.4 displays the 
observed thresholds (σ!"#). The thresholds smoothly increased as external variability 





affecting representations of individual items (Alvarez, 2011; Alvarez & Oliva, 2008; 
Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003; Haberman & Whitney, 2009). Such suggestions 
were motivated by evidence that the observed thresholds in an ensemble averaging task 
tended to be lower than the observed thresholds for identifying individual items. But, 
observed thresholds can be lower due either to decreased internal noise or to increased 
numbers of samples, and the previous work was unable to disentangle the potential 
contributions of these two sources. The variance summation model allows us some 
handle on this question, as it allows us to measure the contributions of each of these 
factors from performance within the ensemble task itself.  
We determined subjects’ thresholds for processing individual gratings within both 
the fovea region and the periphery. Internal noise for ensemble processing across the 
entire display (Figure 2.6) was significantly lower than the observed thresholds for 
discriminating single gratings in the periphery (t(15) = 4.77, p <.01) and marginally 
lower than the thresholds for discriminating single gratings in the fovea (t(15) = 1.59, p = 
.13; Figure 2.6). Importantly, given the crowding controls in our ensemble displays, only 
one or two gratings could appear within the fovea region in ensemble displays- the 
remaining gratings would have appeared in the peripheral region. Because subjects relied 
on many more than one or two gratings during the ensemble feature task, in order to 
approach the performance of the human subjects, any object-based sampling strategy 
would need to assume fovea-level noise across all sampled items, not just for the one or 
two that happened to fall within the fovea region (or, it would need to sample even more 
items than was suggested by the variance summation model; Figure 2.6). Because the 
internal noise for representing individual gratings increases as one moves into the 
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periphery (e.g., note the differences in the observed thresholds for the fovea and 
periphery in Figure 2.6), it would appear that subjects do not rely on selecting and 
averaging individual gratings during the ensemble feature task.  
Thus, variance summation modeling of performance in an average-size ensemble 
feature task suggests that the number of samples required for ensemble processing is 
greater than one or two items and that the internal noise affecting ensemble processing is 
lower than the internal noise for processing a single item presented in the periphery, and 
marginally smaller than the internal noise for processing a single item presented within 
the fovea.  
In Chapter 2, I systematically manipulated the external variability of sizes within 
a set of sine gratings in an ensemble feature task in order to empower variance 
summation modeling to estimate the sample size (n) and internal noise (σ!"#) that affect 
subjects’ processing of average-size information. I also compared these estimates to the 
observed thresholds for processing sine gratings. I found that subjects appear to rely on 
many more than one or two individual gratings when representing the average size of 
items in an ensemble (Figure 2.6). I also found that the internal noise affecting the 
ensemble process is slightly lower than the internal noise that affects the representation of 
individual item sizes within the fovea. The variance summation modeling provides a 
means for studying internal noise and sampling procedures on the basis of performance 
within the ensemble feature task itself, and the results from the variance summation 
model suggest that ensemble processing relies on a mechanism that is distinct from the 
processing of single items. 
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CHAPTER 3. ENSEMBLES IN PERCEPTION, 2: PRECISION AND BIASES 
FOR THE ENSEMBLE FEATURE APPROXIMATE NUMBER ARE AFFECTED 
BY VISUAL GROUPING 
 
3.1 SYNOPSIS 
 Perceptual grouping is known to be a rapid, pre-attentive process that gives rise to 
“higher-units” of representation as generated by an interpretation of configurations in an 
image (for review, see Chapter 3.2.1). In Chapter 3, I aim to build a connection between 
this rapid global processing for perceptual groups and ensemble representations. First, I 
introduce a new modeling approach to determining a formal description of the perceptual 
grouping behavior of human observers (Chapter 3.3). This approach relies on the K-
means clustering algorithm from computer vision (detailed description is provided in 
Chapter 3.3.2). In Section 3.3, I show that this K-means clustering algorithm can provide 
a very accurate fit to human subjects’ estimates of the number of clusters in random dot 
arrays. Then, in Section 3.4, I show that subjects tend to underestimate the number of 
dots in a display when the image contains many clusters (as fitted and predicted by the 
clustering algorithm). In the conclusions, I suggest that perceptual groups may serve as 
units for representation of approximate numbers, allowing for rapid extraction of 
ensemble features from briefly flashed visual scenes.  
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3.2 BACKGROUND  
3.2.1 Perceptual grouping 
 One possible candidate for the mechanism supporting the rapid extraction of 
ensemble representations may be perceptual grouping and mechanisms that work over 
perceptual groups. Humans can readily and near-instantaneously organize the global 
structure from a visual scene by grouping multiple items together. Visual grouping has 
been a significant focus of perception research since it was first emphasized by Gestalt 
psychologists (Kubovy & Podgorny, 1981). The Gestalt psychologists argued that the 
visual system does not simply collect and combine sensory information from the external 
world to form a picture of the world, but instead actively organizes it using various laws 
of grouping, such as proximity. The law of grouping by proximity states that “when the 
[stimulus] field contains a number of equal parts, those among them which are greater in 
proximity will be organized into a higher unit” which “must be considered as real as the 
organization of a homogeneous spot” (Koffka, 1935, pp. 164-165). This “higher unit” 
refers to the product of a perceptual process that actively imposes structures upon the 
incoming sensory information. According to Gestaltists, this “higher-unit” of 
representation is an interpretation of configurations in an image, and it cannot be derived 
simply by examining any constituent parts in the image in isolation. The mental 
computations that are dictated by the law of proximal grouping have been suggested to be 
computed in a bottom-up fashion using relatively local information by algorithms that are 
purely data-driven (Pomerantz, 1983) and achieved at a preattentive stage of the visual-
processing hierarchy (Neisser, 1967).   
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The product from this grouping process then provides the inputs to later 
processing states (Palmer & Rock, 1994; Vecera & O’Reilly, 1998). For example, it has 
been explicitly noted by earlier studies that how elements are grouped in an image affects 
how one perceives the visual number of individual elements in the image (Woodworth & 
Schlosberg, 1954). Depending on spatial configurations the same number of dots may 
result in vastly different experiences of the apparent number of their elements. For 
example, items that are separated further from one another, together occupying a larger 
area on the display, are usually perceived to be more numerous (Bevan, Maier, & Helson, 
1963; Krueger, 1984). Differently located items in the stimulus appear more or less 
numerous depending on how they are distributed such that globally-clustered items, e.g., 
a homogenous density of items, appear to be more numerous than the same number of 
items clustered into multiple sub-groups (Frith & Frith, 1972). Regularly-arranged items 
look more numerous than randomly-distributed items (Ginsburg, 1976; Taves, 1941) and 
random patterns look more numerous than clustered items (Ginsburg & Goldstein, 1987).  
In addition, the grouping pattern in a display also affects number-estimation 
latencies such that dots that are randomly spread out in the periphery of the display are 
enumerated faster than the same number of dots tightly clustered in the center of the 
display (van Oeffelen & Vos, 1982).  
Such biases in estimation can be understood to emerge from Gestalt’s grouping 
principles in which parts (i.e., the individual dots), which join to form a good figure (e.g., 
a regular shaped homogenous cluster in the center of the display), will be experienced as 
less separate than items which join to form multiple clusters or an ill-formed cluster (e.g., 
an irregularly shaped-cluster or two clusters that are spread out into the periphery). That 
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is, a good configuration of items may be grouped into a single unit and tend to serve “as 
real as the organization of a homogeneous spot (Koffka, 1935)”.   
When considering the grouping of many items into sets or chunks, it is important 
to consider the cognitive and processing limitations involved in human set representation. 
Just as with representations of individual objects, set representations of perceptual groups 
are constrained by visual working memory (Nelson Cowan, Chen, & Rouder, 2004; 
Halberda & Feigenson, 2008). The number of sets that can be represented never seems to 
exceed the capacity limits of visual working memory ( three or four set limit in VWM; 
Halberda & Feigenson, 2008). Moreover, sets that are formed from multiple individual 
items can further be bound into a “super-set”, and – when a super set is formed by 
grouping separate subgroups together – the number of sets that can be bound into this 
super set also seems to obey these memory limits (Chase & Ericsson, 1981). 
Given the limited capacity of VWM, this set-based representation by grouping 
could increase the amount of information that can be maintained in memory because 
multiple individual items can be grouped into a set and stored together in memory. For 
example, Xu and Chun (2007) have shown that perceptual grouping enhances visual 
working memory by allowing more visual elements to be remembered when they were 
grouped. Woodman, Vecera, and Luck (2003) have also shown that perceptual grouping 
influences what elements are stored in memory such that when one element of a group 
was stored in working memory, other elements of the sample gestalt group were likely to 
be stored as well. These results suggest that set-based representation can be another unit 
for processing that functions like a single individual object for visual working memory.  
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How is this grouping process achieved? Atkinson, Cambell, and Francis (1976) 
related the grouping of information to the bandwidth of channels tuned to a particular size 
or spatial frequency. Within a region of a certain size, elements are less likely to be 
discriminated and segmented, giving a compulsory perception of a single higher-order 
object. If such channels were arranged hierarchically such that individuals were 
represented by finer channels and entire groups by coarser channels, then ensemble 
representation might be understood to be a statistical description of the activity in finer 
channels within a single coarser channel (e.g., average orientation from multiple crowded 
gabor patched; Parkes et al., 2001). In Experiments B and C, I investigate the possibility 
that perceptual grouping, or clustering, within random dot arrays will affect human 
estimates of the ensemble feature approximate number.  
Although the validity of perceptual grouping seems intuitively apparent, formal 
descriptions of the underlying mechanisms have been lacking: much evidence initially 
presented in support of perceptual grouping has been limited to phenomenological 
demonstrations. This is surprising given that grouping by proximity is one of the most 
well known and intuitively appealing principles. Only a few attempts have been made to 
propose and evaluate formal models of perceptual grouping (e.g., CODE algorithm 
proposed by van Oeffelen & Vos (1982) and evaluated by Compton & Logan (1993)). 
And, existing computational models of perceptual grouping might be improved and 
refined such that the models would be capable of explaining human grouping behavior 
more efficiently, with simpler estimation procedures (e.g., with fewer number of free 
parameters). Here, I propose and test one such approach.  
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In Experiment B, I describe the K-means clustering algorithm, which I will adapt 
from computer vision research, and I present evidence that it provides an adequate fit to 
human observers’ judgments of the number of clusters within random dot arrays. This 
algorithm has 1 free parameter (e.g., compared with the 5 free parameters of CODE, van 
Oeffelen & Vos, 1982). In addition, in Experiment C, I find evidence that the clustering 
estimates generated by K-means clustering provide a viable mechanism for the well 
known phenomenon of human underestimation in enumeration tasks. To wit, the more 
“clustery” an array is – as judged by K-means clustering – the more human observers 
tend to underestimate the total number of items in the array. 
Perceptual groups can be organized at different levels of perceptual hierarchy ( 
e.g., lower levels of hierarchy encoding the more specific details of an image vs. higher 
levels organizing the details into more global structural units; Palmer, 1975). Figure 3.1 
illustrates the idea. In Figure 3.1a, perhaps we see only one cluster of black dots. But, 
other grouping possibilities can be highlighted using color. For instance, an observer 
might experience two groups in Figure 3.1a, as diagrammed using colors in Figure 3.1b - 
one group of 10 dots and another with 7. Or, another observer might experience seven 
groups of 2 or 3 each (as in Figure 3.1c). In this way, grouping by proximity can operate 
under a “tight” grouping criteria - with only the closest elements being grouped (e.g., 
seeing seven groups of dots; Figure 3.1c) – or under a “loose” grouping criteria (e.g., 
seeing two groups of dots; Figure 3.1b). .  
In Section 3.3.2, I introduce a new approach to modeling perceptual grouping 
judgments of human observers in images containing randomly located dots. For 




by a mask array and response array. For the response array, there appeared a linear 
response scale with continuous values from 1 to 40. Subjects were instructed to click on 
any value between 1 and 40 to make a response, using a mouse cursor.  
The task instruction given to the subjects for Experiment B was minimal: the 
subjects were asked to simply judge how many groups of dots were presented. The 
subjects were told that there was no right / wrong answer, that they did not need to group 
items at all if they thought that none of the elements seem to be grouped (if this was the 
case the subjects could simply report the number of individuals) and that they could 
group items however they wanted and felt the most comfortable and natural way.  
 
3.3.2 Modeling: A computer vision approach for modeling grouping within ensembles 
In order to systematically assess the grouping present in each visual image, I 
applied a K-means clustering algorithm –  one of the popular clustering analysis 
techniques that are used in computer vision literature. In computer vision, one of the 
common problems to deal with is segmenting input images so that the computer can do 
further image processing, such as scene and object recognition or image categorization. 
Image segmentation in computer vision is the process of partitioning an image into 
multiple segments (e.g., groups of pixels). The goal of segmentation is to simplify and 
change the representation of an image into something that is more meaningful and easier 
to analyze. In the K-means clustering algorithm, the machine iteratively partitions an 
image into K clusters in order to settle on a final output that appears to be the most 
reasonable segmentation of the image, given the constraints of the algorithm. The basic 
algorithm is as following (see also Figure 3.3):  
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where xp  is the location of each of the dots that belong to a given cluster i  in an image, 
m
i
 is the center location of the cluster, T
d
 is the threshold distance that can be assigned 
to the same cluster, and S
i
indicates the index of each cluster i . Similar to the 
conventional algorithm for a k-means clustering (Lloyd, 1982), the algorithm proceeds by 
alternating between two steps: 
1) Assignment step: Assign each observation to the cluster with the closest mean: 
Si
(t )
= {xp : xp −mi
(t )
< xp −m j
(t )
,∀1≤ j ≤ k
(t )
}
            [3] 
2) Update step: Calculate the new means to be the centroid of the observations in 
the cluster. 











         [4] 
Critically T
d
which is the clustering threshold, defined as the center-to-center 
distance in which elements can be grouped together was set to be a free parameter. In 
other words, the clustering threshold serves such as a window size for grouping such that 
if elements are closer to each other than the size of this grouping window with the 
diameter of the clustering threshold, they will be grouped together. If elements are further 
than the size of the grouping window, however, they will not be grouped. Therefore, T
d
 
determines the extent to which elements are grouped together. For example, if T
d
 is large, 
more and more items will be grouped together while if T
d
 is small, fewer and fewer items 
will be grouped. This is a novel approach that has not previously been taken in the 
computer vision literature. This approach allows me to use T
d
 - and the K-means 
clustering algorithm - as a formal specification of what might be described as the human 
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visual system’s maximal grouping distance.  By fitting the algorithm to the same images 
that human subject saw and determining the number of clusters the model settles on for a 
range of T
d
, this approach will allow me to determine what value for maximal grouping 
distance (T
d
) best matches the judgments of human subjects. 
The model runs the three-step routines iteratively at varying T
d
 values and the 
free parameter T
d
 was determined to be the value that yields the minimum deviance from 
the actual human observer’s response on the number of groups for the stimulus images. 
The model fits the free parameter T
d
 for each subject and for each stimulus image, 
allowing for comparison in grouping window sizes across human subjects in a formally 
constrained and quantitative manner. 
 
3.3.3 Results and Discussion 
It is worth emphasizing that in Experiment B, every single response for each 
visual stimulus is a subjective measure, therefore there are no correct or incorrect 
responses: subjects could group items in whatever way they felt the most natural and 
comfortable. They were free to report how many groups they thought they would parse 
from a given image. Hence, the first analysis for Experiment B is rather qualitative and 
comparative. Specifically, I first compared responses from the 10 subjects on each of the 
images and asked to what extent their responses agreed with one another. Figure 3.4 
shows a few examples of the images shown to the subjects and histograms of the 10 






Together, these results suggest that human subjects’ grouping pattern highly 
agreed with one another and the subjects’ estimation of the number of clusters of 
elements in stimulus images was well captured by a simple model with one free 
parameter for the grouping window size. The perceptual grouping in the stimulus images 
containing randomly positioned dots happened very fast, and possibly in a pre-attentive 
manner, as fast as in 50 msec. To my knowledge, the current study is the first attempt to 
compare quantitatively and systematically the human subjects’ impression of perceptual 
groups in visual images. The subjects’ impression of perceptual groups seems to be a 
“common sense”, meaning that human subjects highly agree with one another in 
organizing perceptual groups and estimating the number of perceptual groups, despite 
that visual input from the images does not favor any one specific grouping strategy. It 
seems that human subjects tend to exploit similar rules for determining whether items are 
grouped together or not, by using similar grouping threshold which is defined here as the 
maximum center-to-center distance among elements in a perceptual group.  
The proposed clustering algorithm revealed that the critical distance for 
determining whether elements are grouped into one cluster was approximately 4˚ of 
visual angle, as the diameter of grouping window. The critical distance for grouping was 
also consistent across individual subjects and across the stimulus images regardless of the 
actual number of items in each of the images. In different contexts, there have been 
interesting findings of 3.5˚- 4˚ of visual angle that may be of relevance to the current 
findings. For instance, the similar numbers, 3.5˚-4.0˚ were found to be a critical distance 
that differentiated qualitatively the patterns of human performance on multiple object 
tracking (MOT) tasks. Alvarez and Franconeri (2007) showed that when the minimum 
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distance between items was closer than 3.5˚ - 4.0˚, human subjects’ accuracy in tracking 
moving target items was not impaired by increasing speed of the moving items. However, 
they showed that the subjects’ accuracy was not affected by the speed of the items, 
yielding the comparable accuracy both for slowly-moving items and fast-moving items 
when the minimum distance between items was greater than 3.5˚-4.0˚. Similarly, this 
specific number of 3.5˚-4.0˚ of visual angle was also observed to be critical for the step 
function of human performance such that confusion non-target items happened when the 
items were closer than this distance of 3.5˚ and 4.0˚ whereas confusion did not happen 
when the items were further than this distance (Bae & Flombaum, 2012). Despite these 
interesting parallels in different contexts of visual processing, the best-fit grouping 
threshold of 4˚ of visual angle still requires further investigation in order for any claims 
about the theoretical implications of this specific number I discovered. For example, it 
should be further examined whether this best-fit grouping threshold of 4˚ visual angle is 
invariant to other factors of images, such as the scale, density, size of items, the total area 
of the visual field and so on. 
 
 
3.4 EXPERIMENT C: CLUSTERING AFFECTS OBSERVERS’ PRECISION 
AND BIASES WHEN EXTRACTING APPROXIMATE NUMBER 
3.4.1 Experimental method 
Subjects 
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In Experiment C, different 10 naive subjects participated in the experiments for 
course credits.  
Apparatus and stimuli  
All the aspects were identical to those in Experiment B.  
Procedure 
Subjects were presented with exactly the same 180 stimulus images that were 
used in Experiment B. The order of presentation of each image was randomized for each 
individual subject, as in Experiment B. On each trial, a stimulus array containing multiple 
dots was presented for 320 msec, followed by a mask array and response array. On the 
response array, a linear response scale with a range from 1 to 40 appeared, such that the 
subject clicked on any values between 1 and 40 to make a response, by using a mouse 
cursor. Unlike in Experiment B, the subjects were asked to estimate the number of 
individual dots, not the number of clusters. No feedback was given to the subjects.  
 
3.4.2 Results and Discussion 
If perceptual groups of elements in a stimulus image provided a unit for this rapid 
extraction of numerosity of individual dots, one would expect that the subjects’ strong 
tendency to underestimate the number of individual dots could be well captured by the 
subjects’ grouping pattern in each of the stimulus images. Therefore, I first asked how 
different grouping patterns in different images affected the subjects’ estimation of the 
number of individual elements. I calculated the clusteredness index that indicated how 
many elements were clustered together in a stimulus image, based on human subjects’ 
responses. The clusteredness index was calculated by dividing the actual number of dots 
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The slopes increased as the estimated clusteredness of the image increased and the one-
way ANOVA revealed that this effect by the clusteredness category of images on the 
slopes was significant (F(3,71) = 14.48, p <.01). Additional one-sample t-tests revealed 
that the slopes for the categories 1-3 were significantly lower than 1 (Category 1: t(17) = 
-11.76, Category 2: t(17) = -10.36,  Category 3: t(17) = -5.96; all p’s < .01), indicating 
that the subjects’ underestimation of numerosity of the dots for the three “more-
clustered” categories, however the slopes for the image that belonged to the “least-
clustered” category were not significantly different from 1 (t(17) = -0.54, p = 0.60), 
indicating no underestimation when the dots were not clustered. This result suggests that 
when human subjects tend to group more items together from a given image, they also 
tend to underestimate the number of elements in the image and vise versa. When dots are 
perceived to be more clustered and grouped on a display, they are perceived as being less 
numerous. However, when the dots are not perceptually clustered, they are not 
underestimated at all. These results suggest that the signature of numerosity 
representation could be well explained by human subjects’ grouping pattern. In specific, 
when human subjects perceived the stimulus image to be more clustered with the 
impression of only a few perceptual groups, they also tended to more underestimate the 
number of individual dots of the image. On the other hand, when they perceived that the 
image was not clustered with the impression that there were more perceptual “groups”, 
their tendency to underestimate the numerosity of the dots disappeared. 
Taken together, these results support the idea that representation of approximate 
number of items may be possible at the level of perceptual groups rather than 
individuated objects, allowing for faster and more global processing for ensembles. 
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Perceived groups in a visual image have been considered as compulsory product from 
automatic, pre-attentive processes (Neisser, 1967). This efficient global representation 
built from the low-level scene structure can be also used for representing ensemble 
features. Such global process will allow the visual system to register multiple elements 
(possibly more items than those the system can process at a time) in a parallel manner, 
giving rise to rapid extraction of ensemble features. Perceptual grouping may serve as a 
form of a primitive chunking such we hierarchically reorganize items in the stimuli and 
group some of them together as a unit for further processing, thereby decreasing the 
amount of information we should process at once. In this manner, perceptual grouping 
allows for parsing multiple nested-levels of representation of the same stimuli from 
individuated items to one global scene representation. Halberda, Sires, and Feigenson 
(2006) suggested that in number estimation task, hierarchical coding of “group” and 
“individual” are both available for enumeration by the approximate number system. They 
further suggested that notion of a “group” may operate prior to enumeration of 
individuals by the approximate number system. The “groups” structured by perceptual 
grouping is a reasonable candidate for ensemble feature representation as well given the 
aspects of the visual images that are used for ensemble representation: many similar 
items are positioned randomly all over the display. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that the elements are spatially grouped into clusters even before ensemble feature 
extraction. As previous researchers speculated, the “groups” built from this automatic 
grouping process is not easily overridden or split into single individuals, unless focused 
attention toward any single individual object is strongly forced to do so. Therefore, 
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perceptual groups built from the visual image may serve as a unit for ensemble 
representation, allowing for a fast, effortless process in global manner.  
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CHAPTER 4. ENSEMBLES IN ATTENTION: EACH ENSEMBLE GROUP 
FUNCTIONS AS A UNIT FOR SUBITIZING 
 
4.1 SYNOPSIS 
 In Chapter 4, I argue that each ensemble group can be selected as a unit for 
attention. This is an important step in the processing of ensemble groups, because it links 
early perceptual processing of ensembles – discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 – to later 
cognition over ensembles (e.g., Working Memory) – discussed in Chapter 5. Here, I 
suggest that attentional selection based on an ensemble can maximize the efficiency of 
attention by saving on the demand of selecting and processing each element separately. In 
Experiment D, I rely on subitizing as an estimate of “unit”-based attentional selection. 
Here, I use the term unit-based in place of the more typical “object”-based, because the 
focus of Chapter 4 will be to demonstrate that each ensemble – consisting of multiple 
similar objects – can function as a single unit for visual indexing and can be subitized just 
as individual objects.  
 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
4.2.1 Units of selection in visual attention: Objects versus ensembles 
Processing objects in a visual scene requires deployment of attentive selection 
(Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1997; Wolfe & Bennett, 1997). The 
classic study (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994) on object-based attention demonstrated that it 
was faster to detect a target when it was located on a cued object than when it was the 
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same distance away, but on an uncued object, suggesting that object is a unit of 
attentional selection. Further work suggests that different features (e.g., color, size, or 
orientation) that belong to a single object are integrated and bound together and selected 
as one single unit (Treisman & Gelade, 1980).   
Visual indexing is the mechanism by which certain salient features or objects in a 
visual display are indexed (Pylyshyn, 1989). It has been suggested that this type of visual 
indexing occurs before, and guides, attentional selection. It may be that indexing is 
limited in addition to the limits of object-based attention. Intuitively, it seems unlikely 
that indexing a scene – particularly a complex one – is performed through a series of 
index assignments (references to items) to each individual unit in that scene. Consistent 
with this intuition, the number of visual indexes employed at once appears to be limited 
(Pylyshyn, 1989). Many researchers have suggested that our ability to attend individual 
objects is limited to approximately 3-4 objects at any one time (Alvarez & Franconeri, 
2007; Z. Pylyshyn, 1989; Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999). But, a question arises: if seeing 
relies on visual indexing, and if indexes are limited, then how is scene perception even 
possible? I believe that this suggests that the visual indexing procedures must be more 
complex than individual references to individual objects. 
One proposal for expanding the diversity of the visual indexing procedures is the 
possibility that one can index via an ensemble representation that is built from multiple 
individual items. In the case of groups of similar items, it seems highly inefficient to 
index individual objects. Instead we might attend those items through just a single 
reference to the entire group as opposed to requiring the computational power of 
attending to each item in that group. Representing an ensemble as a single unit of similar 
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items can therefore increase the efficiency of attention. Ensembles can provide 
compressed information about the general features of a set of multiple objects, saving on 
the demand of selecting and processing each element separately. This may explain how 
representing multiple objects as an ensemble enhances visual cognition (Alvarez, 2011): 
an ensemble consisting of N items is assigned a single visual index, rather than N indices, 
thereby empowering a more efficient use of the limited indexing capacity of visual 
processing. 
The proposal that an ensemble group can be selected as a single unit for “unit”-
based attention has yet to be explored. There are, as yet, no published tests of this 
proposal. Here I explore the possibility that each ensemble must be selected and attended 
to, much like a single object, and that the number of ensembles that may be selected at 
any one time is limited just as it is for individual objects. I focused on a well-known 
process that requires attention to individual units: subitizing (Egeth, Leonard, & 
Palomares, 2008). Enumeration for a small set of items is fast and accurate, and is 
referred to as subitizing (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949). However, for sets 
of items larger than about 3 or 4, a person typically begins enumerating slowly through a 
process of verbal counting, and enumeration is thus slower and more error prone for 
larger numerosities (Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). This dichotomy between subitizing and 
counting, observed in response times and accuracy of enumeration, has been well 
established (e.g., Oyama, Kikuchi, & Ichihara, 1981; Taves, 1941; Trick & Pylyshyn, 
1994). It has been explained as resulting from distinctions in visual working memory, 
FINSTs (Pylyshyn, 1989; Sternberg, 1966), separable neural systems (Piazza, Mechelli, 
Butterworth, & Price, 2002), and pattern recognition (Mandler & Shebo, 1982). The 
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majority of these accounts agree that each object in an enumeration task must be indexed, 
especially for numerosities above 4.  
In this chapter, I test whether enumerating groups of items is also possible (e.g., 
counting the number of groups rather than the number of individual objects). If one 
presumes that ensembles actually receive a single index and function the same way an 
object does, then the same dichotomy should also exist for enumeration of ensembles, or 
groups of items. In other words, the performance of enumeration response times for 
ensembles (i.e., counting each group) should degrade similarly for individual items (i.e., 
counting each dot). Thus, enumeration of ensembles should result in a relatively constant 
response time throughout the subitizing range – i.e., for set sizes between about 1 and 3 – 
and a linearly increasing response-time as a function of set size thereafter, representative 
of the counting range.  
 
4.3 EXPERIMENT D: SUBITIZING ENSEMBLES 
4.3.1 Experimental method 
Subjects 
17 naive subjects participated in the experiment for course credits. All of the 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Apparatus and stimuli  
The stimuli were generated using MATLAB software, together with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), and were displayed on 
an LCD monitor driven by a Macintosh iMac computer (the viewable area was a gray 





without encoding any ensemble information from each group. Therefore, Experiment E 
was conducted as a simple follow-up to ensure that the observers represented ensembles 
rather than only picking up color information from a few of the individuals or a coarse 
coding. In Experiment E, I asked subjects to report either the number of groups 
(Ensemble subitizing) or the number of individual dots within an ensemble (Approximate 
number).  
4.4.1 Experimental method 
Subjects 
6 naive subjects participated in the experiment for course credits. All of the 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Apparatus and stimuli  
 All the aspects of stimuli were identical to those in Experiment D. In this 
experiment, I only used the stimuli from the Ensemble subitizing trials in which 1-6 
clusters of dots with different colors were presented.  
Procedure  
Figure 4.4 shows the sequence of a trial. After a screen indicating that the subject 
will begin the trial, the stimulus was displayed. The stimulus duration was varied from 
250 msec to 1000 msec. After the stimulus array, a mask was presented for 200 msec and 
then the subjects were prompted to report either on the number of clusters (Ensemble 
subitizing) or the number of elements of one of the presented clusters (Approximate 
number). For the Approximate number question, a probe with the color of one of the 
clusters appeared on the location of the cluster that the subject had to report about. The 




CHAPTER 5. ENSEMBLES IN WORKING MEMORY: EACH ENSEMBLE IS 




 Chapter 5 explores how ensemble representations are encoded and stored in 
memory. Specifically, I sought to determine if ensemble representations flexibly change 
in precision such that representations become more precise with more encoding time and 
with lower memory load. To address this question, I varied both stimulus duration (e.g. 
33, 66, 99, 132, and 198 msec) and the number of ensembles presented in the visual array 
(e.g., 1, 3, or 6 sets). Here I introduce a new approach to measuring the precision of 
internal representation in a more robust manner, by empirically measuring an individual 
subject’s guessing pattern and by using this estimate of the subject’s guessing pattern to 
aid in filtering out guess trials from the mixture of guess and regular responses on the 
trials of interest (i.e., trials where a stimulus was actually presented). The results of this 
modeling approach suggest that, when guess trials are appropriately filtered out, the 
precision of internal representations does not appear to improve over time or with lower 
memory load. This supports the construct of a fixed precision of visual working memory 




5.2.1 Fixed or flexible precision of visual working memory representations 
 With every movement of our eyes or shift of attention, the visual environment is 
constantly changing and each snapshot of the visual world is overflowing with 
information about various features, objects, and collections. Given the dynamic and 
complex nature of the visual world, processing time (e.g., the amount of time we can 
dedicate to gathering evidence to represent the visual world) and capacity limitations 
(e.g., the total amount of information that can be processed or stored at a given time) 
have been widely discussed as major factors that limit the resolution of human visual 
representation and cognition more generally. For example, many have suggested that the 
precision and accuracy of our visual representations improve progressively such that they 
become more precise and refined when we are given longer periods of time to view a 
stimulus (e.g., Carrasco & McElree, 2001; Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993; Grill-Spector 
& Kanwisher, 2005; Liu & Jiang, 2005; McElree & Carrasco, 1999; Vogel, Woodman, & 
Luck, 2006) or a smaller number of visual items to process (e.g., Alvarez & Franconeri, 
2007; Bays & Husain, 2008; Dobkins & Bosworth, 2001; Franconeri et al., 2007; Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Palmer et al., 1993; Palmer, 1990; Sakai et al., 2007)  
 Consistent with the intuition that our visual representations can improve with 
increased viewing time and with reduced cognitive load, a number of authors have 
recently championed a ‘flexible resource’ model of visual working memory (VWM) 
where representations are allowed to have a flexible, or graded, amount of precision 
(sometimes called ‘variable precision’) (Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 2009; Bays & Husain, 
2008; Palmer, 1990; van den Berg, Shin, Chou, George, & Ma, 2012; Wilken & Ma, 
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2004). However, empirical findings of better performance in visual tasks involving 
longer display times and fewer visual items could occur given a fixed resolution, discrete 
system of visual representations - e.g., because observers might be able to process and 
store more discrete bits of information from a visual scene as viewing time is increased or 
item-load is reduced (e.g., Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2011; Pashler, 1988; Province & 
Rouder, 2012; Rouder et al., 2008; Zhang & Luck, 2008). And, when time is severely 
limited or too much information needs to be processed at the same time, human observers 
might encode a portion of information from the scene (at a fixed precision) and then rely 
on strategies to fill-in information about any unprocessed regions or items (e.g., strategic 
guessing).  
 Because behavioral responses in a visual task likely reflect a mixture of responses 
based on internal representations and those based on strategic guesses it has become 
crucial to sort a subject’s responses into these two classes (or a blending of these classes) 
in order to determine if internal representations are indeed ‘flexible’ (i.e., with variable 
precision across time and load) or ‘fixed’ (i.e., at a specific level of precision). To date, 
authors in the vision sciences, and throughout psychophysics more generally, have 
included parameters in their models to estimate the frequency of random guesses that are 
not responsive to the signal (e.g., the inclusion of ‘lapse parameters’ in models of signal-
detection tasks). This requires assuming that human guessing is unstrategic and uniformly 
distributed across all possible signals. But such assumptions are likely to be untrue of real 
human observers, and any mismatch between these assumptions and actual human 
performance will obfuscate attempts to estimate the precision of internal visual 
representations.  
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 Here, I directly measure the guessing patterns of individual observers in the 
absence of a physical stimulus during visual tasks. I find that guessing is never random 
nor uniformly distributed - calling into question the assumptions of many previous 
modeling efforts (e.g., Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Green & Swets, 1966; Halberda & 
Feigenson, 2008; Ludwig & Rhys Davies, 2011; Rouder et al., 2008; Zhang & Luck, 
2008, 2011). I then use each subject’s idiosyncratic guessing pattern to better identify 
possible guesses that may have occurred on trials where a signal was presented - i.e., I 
determine a likelihood for each behavioral response indicating an estimate of the 
probability that the response was based on the subject’s internal representation of the 
visual stimulus as opposed to their own personal guessing strategy. This likelihood (a 
continuous likelihood ranging from 0 ‘pure guess’ to 1 ‘pure internal representation’) can 
also be used to estimate indeterminate blends (e.g., likelihood ~.5) where the subject 
might have used either their internal representation, a strategic guess, or a blending of the 
two. I then use the likelihood from each trial to weight each trial’s contribution to a 
modeled estimate of the internal precision of the subject’s visual representations. This 
allows me to determine whether visual representations have a ‘flexible’ or ‘fixed’ 
precision, while controlling for strategic guessing, both across viewing times and item-
loads. To date, this approach has not been used, and previous authors have either 
assumed that guesses are uniform and unstrategic (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Green & 
Swets, 1966; Halberda & Feigenson, 2008; Ludwid & Davies, 2011; Rouder et al., 2008; 
Zhang & Luck, 2008; 2011) or - in the most extreme case - that human subjects never 
actually guess during behavioral tasks (van den Berg et al., 2012). 
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 In Chapter 5, I demonstrate that ensemble representations are encoded and stored 
at a fixed, not flexible, precision and that behavioral responses within a trial are either 
based on this fixed internal representation or on a strategic guess, and rarely if ever on a 
blending of the two. For coherence, I chose to focus on approximate number and average 
size throughout this dissertation; however, though not included in this dissertation, I also 
tested other visual features for individual objects (Color, Orientation, and Length) in 
separate experiments outside of this dissertation. In all of these experiments, I used this 
same approach to model human responses and I also found the same result, i.e., the 
precision of internal representations in VWM did not change over time and with different 
item loads. The same pattern that I observed from representing ensemble (e.g., 
approximate number) and individual features from single items (e.g., Color, Orientation, 
and Length) suggests that approximate number can be extracted in the same manner as 
other basic visual features from individual objects. Going beyond ensemble 
representation, this chapter will more generally propose that visual representations 
(including ensembles) are best understood as emerging from a detect-or-guess fixed 
resolution system - a finding that is consistent with diffusion-to-criterion models of the 
encoding of motion (Ditterich, 2006) and orientation information (Ludwig & Rhys 
Davies, 2011), and is consistent with recent results suggesting that humans rely on a 
recall-or-guess retrieval of representations from long-term memory (Province & Rouder, 
2012). This recall-or-guess model is also consistent with recent studies on the decay of 
working memory representations (Zhang & Luck, 2009) showing that precision of the 
stored representations decay in an all-or-none manner, rather than gradually decreasing 
over time.  
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 The results presented in this chapter (and the results from the work I’ve done on 
individual object features that does not appear in this dissertation) bear on recent claims 
that VWM relies on flexible representations - claims that were based on studies which 
assumed human guessing to be nonstrategic and uniformly distributed (Bays et al., 2009; 
Palmer, 1990). In the most extreme case, authors of previous modeling efforts have gone 
so far as to suggest that humans never guess at all (van den Berg et al., 2012; Wilken & 
Ma, 2004). The work in this chapter presents empirical evidence that these assumptions 
are inappropriate and that the inaccuracy of these assumptions can lead psychological 
models to falsely suggest that visual representations are flexible. 
  
5.3 EXPERIMENT F: MEASURING ESTIMATION BIAS AND INTERNAL 
PRECISION 
5.3.1 Experimental method 
Subjects 
10 subjects participated in the experiment. All of the subjects had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The subjects received monetary compensation for 
participation. 
Apparatus and stimuli  
Stimuli were generated using MATLAB software together with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (37, 38) and displayed on a LCD monitor with a grey 
background driven by a Macintosh iMac computer (viewable area was a gray central 
square window with a 17’’ diagonal). The subjects were seated approximately 50 cm 
from the screen, and viewed the display binocularly. At this viewing distance, each pixel 
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Figure 5.1 illustrates example guess and test trials. Each trial consisted of a 
stimulus array with a varying duration (0, 33, 66, 99, 132, or 198 msec) followed by a 
mask and probe display that remained present until a response was made. The stimulus 
array consisted of one, three, or six collections of multiple dots. Feature value of each 
item was randomly selected from a uniform distribution (e.g., a target value between 5 
and 35 dots). The probe display contained a white circle to indicate which cluster subjects 
should recall and the linear response scale ranging from 0 to 45 on which they clicked the 
numerosity value of the probed cluster using the computer mouse. Accuracy was stressed, 
but subjects were asked to estimate and to make a response as soon as possible. The 
duration of the memory array and the array size (e.g., 1, 3, or 6 cluster) was randomly 
varied and subjects were informed when they could not recall the stimulus, they should 
make their best guess. There were eight separate blocks consisting of 198 test trials (total 
1584 trials per subject) and subjects received 30 practice trials before the test trials.  
 
5.3.2 Modeling: A new approach to mixture modeling 
 My mixture model consists of a model for guessing that is built upon empirically 
measured responses from an individual observer on trials with 0-msec-stimulus duration 
and a model for internal representation for approximate number.  
 
Model structure 
 In the model for internal representation, two free parameters were defined and 
fitted via the standard maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure: Pint reflecting 
the mean probability of the data points being drawn from an internal representation of the 
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stimulus and CVint which inversely reflects the precision of internal representation of 
approximate number (i.e., smaller CVint indicates more precise internal representations).  
The first parameter of Pint estimates the overall proportion of an observer’s 
responses that are likely to have been drawn from an internal representation of the 
presented stimulus image, as opposed to guessing. Thus the compliment of Pint would 
reflect the guess rate – that is, the degree to which an observer relied on their non-visual 
guess strategy rather than consulting their internal representation.  
The second parameter, CVint , is a parameter that determines the normalized 
standard deviation of Gaussian distributions, describing inherent noise of the internal 
representations. Due to scalar variability, the standard deviation of the Gaussian 
distribution for each numerosity is a function of the stimulus numerosity such that SD 
increases linearly with the stimulus. CVint reflects the overall precision of the internal 
representations, independent of the presented numerosity, via normalization by the mean 
of the actual magnitude. The model’s estimate of CVint was determined by weighting the 
contribution of each observation by the estimated likelihood value for each data point – 
i.e., the likelihood that the response was drawn from an internal representation of the 
stimulus (Pint for each data point). In this way, using each subject’s personal guessing 
strategy to determine the likelihood that a response was generated based on an internal 
representation of the stimulus (versus being drawn from their own personal guess 
strategy) allows observations that were more likely drawn from an internal representation 
to contribute more to the MLE estimation of CVint.  
The model for guessing does not simply assume a uniform distribution but rather 
involves empirical measurement of individual subject’s guessing pattern based on their 
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responses from trials with 0-ms-stimulus-duration. I estimated the distribution of each 
subject’s guess responses on the trials with 0-msec-stimulus duration by using Kernel 
density estimation, which is a non-parametric way of estimating the probability density 
function of a random variable (Rosenblatt, 1956; Wasserman, 2006).  
 
Algorithm 
From each data point on an individual trial, the model evaluates the probability of 
the single data point of subject’s response being drawn from internal representation as 
opposed to being drawn from guessing. The probability of a single data point (Xi, Yi), if 
it follows internal representation, is defined as:  
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where X! is the actual numerosity of dots presented in a stimulus array, Y! is a subject’s 
reported value, , and CV!"# is the coefficient of variation (CV) of the internal 
representation. The mapping function between the actual magnitude and the reported 
value was defined as a power function, Y = X! and here the exponent β was fixed to be 
0.9 based on the previous findings that the representation of numerosity follows a power 
function with an exponent typically around 0.85-0.95 (e.g., Krueger, 1984). CVint is the 
normalized standard deviation in order to account for the known scalar variability in 
representations of approximate number. 
The probability of a single data point (Xi, Yi), if it follows a distribution of guess 
responses, is defined from the probability density function calculated by kernel density 
estimation. For a subjects’ guess responses (X1,X2, ..., Xi) collected from trials with 0-
msec-stimulus duration , the kernel density estimator is defined to be  
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determined by averaging the latent variable Z to indicate the overall proportion of regular 
responses from internal representation within a set of responses at each stimulus duration.  
 
5.3.3 Results and Discussion 
Human guess responses are not random nor uniformly distributed 
 Authors of previous studies have assumed that human guesses are unstrategic, 
random, and uniformly distributed across all possible target feature values, but have not 
directly measured guessing (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Green & Swets, 1966; Halberda 
& Feigenson, 2008; Ludwid & Davies, 2011; Rouder et al., 2008; Zhang & Luck, 2008; 
2011). Here, I measured guessing empirically and we find that these assumptions are 
inappropriate. Figure 5.2 presents the 0 msec responses from one representative subject in 
along with the corresponding histogram and probability density functions  derived from 
these guessing trials. The histogram and PDF in Figure 5.2 were formed by collapsing 
across all 0 msec trials for one subject. The high regions indicate regions of frequent 
guesses while the lows indicate regions of rare guesses. All subjects tended to avoide 
guessing at the highest and lowest values in the response range and instead focused the 
majority of their guesses in the middle of the range. Importantly, this guessing strategy 
did not reflect the trials subjects saw during the task, as trials were selected from a 
uniform distribution.  Rather, the unimodal guessing strategy of subject appears to 
depend on their attempt to avoid large errors in estimation – i.e., a strategic decision.  

 78 
5.2 was generated by nonparametric kernel density estimation (Rosenblatt, 1956; 
Wasserman, 2005). A non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was performed to 
compare the guessing pattern from each subject with a null, uniform distribution and it 
confirmed non-uniformity of subjects’ guessing distributions for all subjects (all p’s < 
.01). These results suggest that human guessing is neither random nor uniformly 
distributed in approximate number tasks (NB, I also found non-uniformity for guessing in 
every visual feature I investigated, e.g., Color, Size, Orientation). The peaks of both the 
histogram and the probability density function at the center of the range (e.g., around 20-
25) suggest that the observers favored the intermediate values when guessing but they 
avoided making guesses near the endpoints of the magnitude scale (e.g., near 0 or near 
45) - in an apparent attempt to reduce error variability. This pattern was highly consistent 
across subjects. It seems that the subjects relied on a similar strategy of making guess 
responses toward the center of the linear number scale in order to minimize overall error. 
This suggests that the subjects make guess responses in an educated, strategic way to 
optimize their outcome instead of making non-informative random responses. The 
empirically measured guessing pattern was highly consistent across individual subjects. 
This finding suggests that subjects maintained shared expectations and knowledge about 
the task and visual feature (Numerosity) and brought these to bear when making strategic 
non-uniform guesses. The actual numerosity of the dots for each cluster was determined 
from uniform distribution of stimulus value throughout the task, suggesting that the non-
uniform guessing patterns observed on 0 msec trials are not simply a reflection of the 
particular trials that subjects saw, but rather reflect subjects’ own strategic decisions and 
knowledge of the task (e.g., an attempt to reduce error variability by focusing guesses 
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towards the center of magnitude scales). These results suggest that any attempt to 
estimate the bias and the precision of internal representations must include an empirical 
estimate of non-uniform guessing in order to effectively remove guesses from the dataset. 
Given that numerosity representation is just one example of a feature dimension with 
scalar variability – i.e., the same basic structure shared by the vast majority of 
psychological representations (e.g., brightness, loudness, felt electric shock, odor 
concentration, finger spacing etc., Teghtsoonian, 1971) – the present results draw 
attention to the possibility that the quite ubiquitous practice of including non-strategic 
‘lapse’ parameters in psychophysical models that assume uniform, unstrategic guessing 
may not be accurately capturing human performance.  
 
Representations of ensembles are encoded and stored in memory in an all-or-none 
manner  
 For the fidelity of internal representations, it is necessary to consider CVint, the 
normalized version of standard deviation of Gaussian distributions fitted to human 
responses. Using the empirically-determined guessing pattern for each subject (e.g., 
Figure 5.2) and an appropriate model of internal precision (Figure 5.4), I ran an iterative 
mixture modeling procedure using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) on each 
subject’s raw response data to recover three components - the probability of answering 
based on the internal representation (Pint) and the observed precision of visually-guided 
responses (CVint). This iterative MLE procedure estimated the likelihood for each trial 




and there are roughly an equal number of trials in each plot - this allows the reader to 
investigate the ratio of red-ish to green-ish circles in order to understand how 
representations and behavior may change over time (e.g., 33 to 198 msc) and over item 
load (e.g., 1, 3, and 6 sets).  
The iterative MLE procedure was run separately for each subject and for each 
condition of interest (i.e., 33, 66, 99, 132, 198 msec; 1, 3, 6 items). This means that a 
separate MLE value for e.g., Pint and CVint is generated for each of the plots in Figure 5.6 
allowing one to ask whether the probability that a subject answers based on an internal 
representation increases over display time (e.g., increasing red and decreasing green 
circles in the plots as display time increases from 33 to 198 msec) and whether the 
fidelity of internal representations increase either over increasing display times or 
reduced item loads (e.g., reducing spread in the shape of the band of the red circles across 
time or load). 
 The probability of responding based on an internal representation, Pint, increased 
over display times as subjects tended to rely more and more on internal representations as 
they were given more time to view the stimulus (e.g., green circles reducing across 
display times in Figure 5.6). This can also be seen in Figure 5.7, which presents 
histograms for the likelihood values displayed in Figure 5.6. In Figure 5.7 one can see the 
shift in likelihood values as the majority of responses appear to be drawn from the 
subject’s guess distribution (i.e., green bars) at shorter display times while the majority of 
responses appear to be drawn from the subject’s internal representation of the stimulus at 






parameter values for CVint, which index the fidelity of the internal visual representations. 
If visual representations have a flexible precision that can improve across display times 
(e.g., as the viewer gathers more visual evidence) or across decreasing item load (e.g., as 
the viewer has fewer items they need to process) then we should observe a significant 
increase in CVint as item load increases (e.g., 6-item trials would result in significantly 
higher CVint (i.e., worse precision and more underestimation) than 1-item trials) and as 
display time decreases (e.g., 33 msec displays would result in significantly higher CVint 
than 198 msec displays). This is not the pattern I observe (Figure 5.8). Rather, once 
guessing trials are effectively removed and weighted by the likelihood function, I find 
little to no evidence for changes in CVint across time and item load.  
These results are consistent with some other recent results. In some cases, 
proponents of drift-diffusion models of cognition (DDM) have suggested that observers 
do not benefit from prolonged accumulation of perceptual evidence - beyond the point 
when the accumulation process reaches the threshold for a perceptual decision (Ratcliff, 
Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1999; Ratcliff, 1978). Our observed increases in Pint with 
increasing display times are consistent with diffusion towards a bound and with DDM in 
general. In addition, other work has suggested that subjects may be ignorant of perceptual 
signals during the perceptual accumulation process - until this process crosses the 
detection/decision threshold (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff, Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1999). This 
is consistent with the current findings of no change in CVint with decreasing display 
times. That is, even at the briefest display times, where very few trials appear to involve 
responses based on an internal representation, the precision of the internal representations 
appear to be fixed and constant. This result is also consistent with recent findings 
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suggesting that the precision of internal representations might be highly limited in their 
ability to evolve and be refined over time (Ludwig & Davies, 2011).  
 There are other recent suggestions that VWM representations may have a ‘fixed‘ 
rather than ‘flexible‘ precision, but that precision may appear higher at lower item loads 
do to a blending of information from multiple samples (e.g., “slots plus averaging” Zhang 
& Luck, 2008; 2011; also see van den Berg et al., 2012). While our results support the 
notion of fixed precision, our empirical work suggests that there is also no change in the 
precision of internal representations over time and across set sizes.  
 Chapter 5 demonstrates that the precision of internal representation of 
approximate number is fixed, not flexibly changing over time and with different set sizes. 
These results suggest that ensemble representations are encoded and stored in memory in 
a discrete and all-or-none manner.  
 Outside of the work presented in this dissertation, I also tested different visual 
features using the same experimental paradigm and the same modeling approach. These 
results returned converging evidence that the precision of visual internal representations 
does not change but remains fixed when there is more time to process and there is less 
information load. This converging evidence further confirms that ensemble 
representations such as approximate number behave much like any basic visual features 
such as color, orientation, or line length. In addition, as a more general conclusion, results 
from this broader line of research support a general framework of human visual 
representations: internal visual representations are fixed in precision and encoded and 
stored in an all-or-none manner.  
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 It would seem to be commonsensical that the longer and ‘harder’ you look at 
something, the better you are able to represent it. Likewise, one might expect that the 
fewer items we process or actively remember at one time, the more accurately we will 
represent them. However, rather than resting on a foundation of ‘flexible’ precision or 
changing cognitive ‘resources’, such experiences might arise from an emerging trade-off 
between time, items, and the allocation of limited ‘fixed’ precision representations - 
along with the strategic benefits of nonrandom, non-uniform guessing. My work suggests 
that, when we are asked to make judgments about visually presented items and 
collections, our impression of gradually evolving/improving visual representations with 
variable levels of precision may be a grand illusion.  
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
My dissertation research explores ensemble visual representations through 
perception, attention, and memory. Chapter 2 presented evidence that extraction of the 
ensemble feature average size is unlikely to require segmentation or sampling of 
individual items. The results of Experiment A suggest that representing ensembles (e.g. 
mean size) is more likely to rely on a distinct mechanism from that involved in 
representing individual objects. The mechanisms supporting ensemble representations 
appear to be more efficient than the mechanisms for representing individual objects and 
are subject to a lower level of internal noise. This is consistent with previous findings 
showing that the fidelity of ensemble representations are more resilient to forgetting and 
more robust than those for individual items (Alvarez & Oliva, 2008; Ariely, 2001; Chong 
& Treisman, 2003). Unlike representations of individual objects, ensemble 
representations appear to be rely on fast pooling processes.  
In Chapter 3, I investigated one of the possible candidate algorithms that may also 
support the representation of ensembles: an early grouping process that gives rise to set-
based representations of groups of objects. Set-based representations require individual 
objects to be bound into a group, providing another type of higher-order representation. 
Experiment B presented a new approach to providing a quantitative description of set-
based representations by spatial grouping. Based on the results from Experiment B, 
human observers appear to rely on principles for perceptual grouping based on proximity 
that are similar to those incorporated in the k-means clustering algorithm from computer 
vision. Specifically, the estimated maximal grouping window size for human observers 
was highly consistent across observers and across dot arrays, suggesting that humans rely 
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on a default grouping distance in the vicinity of 4-degrees of visual angle. The estimated 
grouping window size remained constant across various numerosities of items and across 
different durations of visual array presentation, suggesting that grouping sets of objects is 
likely a parallel process rather than a serial process. Experiment C further examined a 
potential connection between parallel grouping and representing ensembles and showed 
that the pattern of set representations by spatial grouping predicted various biases of 
ensemble representations. These results suggest that perceptual groups built from 
individuals in a fast, parallel manner can affect ensemble representations of the visual 
array. Specifically, the well known tendency of human observers to underestimate the 
number of items in a stimulus can be predicted by the extent of clustering in the array as 
estimated by the k-means clustering algorithm. Chapters 2 and 3 together suggest that 
ensemble representations are extracted in a parallel manner, distinct from representing 
individual objects but similar to texture perception or set-based representations by 
grouping.  
Chapter 4 explored ensembles as units of attentional selection. I tested ensemble-
based subitizing – since subitizing is known to require attentional selection to index each 
individual unit. Experiment D revealed that human observers can use ensembles as units 
for visual indexing and can subitize the number of ensemble groups in a display rather 
than just individual objects that make up a cluster. Additionally, Experiment E further 
demonstrates that the success of ensemble subitizing and the success of extraction of an 
ensemble feature (approximate number of elements within an ensemble) highly correlated 
with each other, suggesting that selection of an ensemble may be required for the 
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extraction of approximate number from the ensemble. Experiments D and E, therefore, 
together suggest that ensembles can be higher-order units for attentional selection.  
The research in Chapter 5 demonstrates that ensemble representations are encoded 
and stored in memory in an all-or-none manner. Experiment F shows that the precision of 
internal representations of an ensemble feature (approximate number) does not change 
over time or with varying set sizes. This supports a proposal for fixed-precision of visual 
representations. In work outside the scope of this dissertation, I have extended this 
approach to other basic visual features for individual objects (Color, Orientation, and 
Line length). The same basic pattern was observed, suggesting that the precision of 
internal visual representation does not change over viewing time and item load. From 
Chapter 5, and from the other related experiments that used the same approach but 
different types of visual features, I draw a more general framework of human visual 
representation: the fidelity of internal visual representations is fixed and inflexible, and 
just like representations of visual objects, ensemble representations are also extracted, 
encoded, and stored in memory in a discrete and all-or-none manner. 
The work in this dissertation represents an attempt to build a unified 
understanding of visual processing and the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms 
involved in ensemble feature representation. The picture that emerges from my work is 
one in which whole groups can function as units for perception and cognition, ensemble 
features of these groups are extracted rapidly and in parallel (i.e., without sub-sampling), 
and features are stored in memory in an all-or-none fashion at a fixed resolution. The 
shape of my proposal owes a debt to Gestalt psychology, and ideas of grouping and 
hierarchical representation that have played a central role throughout information 
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processing approaches to modeling the human mind. While the work in this dissertation 
represents, perhaps, a case study – focused on approximate number – I believe that it 
presents an honest and robust attempt to investigate the functioning of ensemble features 
from the earliest stages of visual processing (e.g., perceptual grouping) through cognition 
and working memory. I feel that this approach is richer than focusing on any one of these 
stages in isolation, and I look forward to future detailed work along similar lines for other 
visual features (e.g., Color, Orientation, Length).    
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